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EROSION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides for the right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects.' This right is protected by
provisions against unreasonable searches and seizures, and by
the requirement that warrants be issued only upon probable
cause supported by oath, describing in particular the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.2 The
means of implementing the protections afforded by the fourth
amendment has generated a great deal of controversy.
The exclusionary rule, one of the tools to safeguard
fourth amendment rights, excludes from criminal proceedings
all evidence obtained pursuant to an illegal search and
seizure. Almost from its inception, the rule has been attacked
as inadequate because it protects a criminal's constitutional
rights at the price of suppressing valid, probative evidence.s
The exclusionary rule is not constitutionally mandated by
fourth amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches
and seizures.4 It is, rather, a judicial remedy purporting to
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1. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Id. See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 372 (5th
ed. 1883). Writing about unreasonable searches and seizures, Cooley states that "it is
better often times that crime should go unpunished than that a citizen should be
liable to have his premises invaded, his desks broken open, his private books, letters
and papers exposed to prying curiosity, and to misconstructions of ignorant and sus-
picious persons. .. "
3. See, e.g., Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62
JUDICATURE 214 (1978).
4. See Wilkey, A Call for Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule: Let Congress
and the Trial Courts Speak, 62 JUDICATURE 351, 354 (1979). Judge Wilkey states that
"the definition of 'unreasonable searches and seizures' is nowhere found in the Con-
stitution. It has been a matter for the courts to decide, and it could be a matter for
Congress." See Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspective: The
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safeguard fourth amendment guarantees through its deterrent
effect on police misconduct.5 The rule is also invoked to avoid
any judicial taint arising from the use of illegally obtained evi-
dence,6 and as a means of assuring the people that the govern-
ment will not profit from its lawless behavior." Through a con-
tinuous process of erosion, the policies aimed at avoiding
judicial taint and maintaining governmental integrity have
been abandoned, leaving deterrence as the rule's only, al-
though doubtful, justification.8 "The rule is calculated to pre-
vent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect
for the constitutional guarantee in the only effective available
way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."
The Burger Court, in questioning the rule's deterrent ef-
fect, has engaged itself in an erosion process by restricting the
exclusion of evidence and expanding the number of exigent
circumstances permitting warrantless searches. 10 This com-
ment traces the Supreme Court's erosion of the exclusionary
rule and will examine whether the highest Court will discard
this controversial remedy or simply continue its erosion. The
Court's alternatives may depend upon the congressional re-
sponse to Chief Justice Burger's 1971 proposal that Congress
provide a tort remedy for those defendants whose rights have
been violated." Such legislation, if enacted, would probably
signal the end of the exclusionary rule. 2 If, on the other hand,
Struggle to Make the Fourth Amendment More than an Empty Blessing, 62 JuDCA-
TURE 337 (1979). Professor Kamisar suggests that the exclusionary rule is not necessa-
rily mandated by the fourth amendment, but states that any arrest, search, or seizure
in violation of the amendment is nevertheless illegal regardless of the application of
the rule. See also Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a
Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251, 337-66 (1974).
5. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
6. The courts cannot become "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Con-
stitution they are sworn to uphold." See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223
(1960).
7. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The exclusionary rule serves to assure the people that the government would not
profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining
popular trust in government.
8. Id. at 347-48 n.5.
9. Id. (quoting with approval Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
10. Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Excep-
tion to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635, 649 (1979).
11. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 422 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
12. See Moya, Picking On the Poisonous Fruit, NAT'L J., June 8, 1981 at 1, col.
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Congress fails to provide such a remedy, the Court may opt to
further erode the rule, allowing into evidence the fruits of ille-
gal searches and seizures in which the police, although acting
in good faith, have violated fourth amendment require-
ments.1" In either case, the burden remains with the Court to
protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects. The judiciary, as well as other
branches of government, need be mindful of Justice Brandeis'
words:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will
be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.
Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its ex-
ample. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy.1'
II. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND ITS EROSION
A. Historical Perspective
The application of the exclusionary rule by state courts
has had a short history. The California Supreme Court, for
example, has applied the rule for only twenty-seven years
since its decision in People v. Cahan.15 In contrast, the rule's
application in federal courts dates back to Weeks v. United
States," decided in 1914.17
In Weeks, the Supreme Court ruled that evidence ille-
gally obtained must be excluded from criminal proceedings.
The defendant had been charged with using the mails to
13. Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist as well as Chief Justice Burger have
expressed their support for the good-faith exception. See supra note 10.
14. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
15. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
16. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
17. The forerunner of Weeks was Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In
Boyd, the Court, per Justice Bradley, held that a forced production of papers
amounted to an unreasonable search directed toward the acquisition of mere evidence
of crime. The fourth amendment protections were applicable and the forced produc-
tion of evidence leading to the defendant's self-incrimination was prohibited by the
fifth amendment.
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transport lottery tickets. These tickets were found during a
warrantless search prior to defendant's arrest.18 Justice Day
wrote that:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of
the country to obtain convictions by means of unlawful
seizures ... should find no sanctions in the judgment of
the courts which are charged at all times with the support
of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions
have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such funda-
mental rights."
In Weeks, defendant's property was searched and the evi-
dence seized by a United States Marshall in collaboration
with other officers who engaged in a warrantless search of the
defendant's house.20 Since the evidence had been obtained as
a result of illegal conduct by a federal officer, the Weeks opin-
ion left undecided whether the Court would apply the same
rule to illegal conduct by a state official. Heretofore, the
fourth amendment protections were a matter of federal con-
stitutional interpretation.
Thirty-five years later in Wolf v. Colorado1 the Court ex-
tended fourth amendment protections to defendants in state
prosecutions. Although not ready to impose the restrictions of
Weeks upon the states, the Court held that the fourth amend-
ment was incorporated into the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. A law enforcement officer could not in-
trude arbitrarily into one's privacy, but the relevant evidence
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure was admissi-
ble in state court.2 Justice Douglas objected to the Court's
holding, stating that evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment had to "be excluded in state, as well as
federal prosecutions, since in absence of that rule of evidence
the amendment would have no effective sanction."23
In the 1961 landmark decision of Mapp v. Ohio,24 the
18. 232 U.S. at 387.
19. Id. at 392.
20. Id. at 386.
21. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
22. Id. at 33. Justices Murphy, Douglas, and Rutledge dissented from the opin-
ion by Justice Frankfurter. The three dissenters, in separate opinions, wrote that not-
withstanding the Court's data showing that two thirds of the states had not adopted
the Weeks rule, they would nevertheless apply it uniformly to all states.
23. Id. at 40.
24. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Ohio state police broke into the accused's apart-
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Court applied the exclusionary rule to the states. In an opin-
ion by Justice Clark, the Court overruled Wolf and held "that
all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violations of
the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
state court."2 The Court noted that many states which op-
posed the exclusionary rule before Wolf had, by their own leg-
islative or judicial decisions, "wholly or partly adopted or ad-
hered to the Weeks rule." 26 Reasoning that the exclusionary
rule was an essential part of both the fourth and fifth amend-
ments,27 Justice Clark suggested that a failure to adopt it
would lead to double standards of justice. In states where the
exclusionary rule was inoperative, federal officials could sim-
ply "step across the street to the state's attorney with uncon-
stitutionally seized evidence" and procure a defendant's pros-
ecution "in a state court in utter disregard for the fourth
amendment. 218 The Court acknowledged that the conse-
quence of the rule's application would indeed result in Justice
Cardozo's prediction that "[t]he criminal [was] to go free be-
cause the constable has blundered." '29 The Court, however,
was more concerned with the imperative of judicial integrity.
If the criminal was to go free, "[iut [was] the law that [set]
him free. Nothing [could] destroy a government more quickly
than its failure to observe its own laws, its disregard of the
charter of its own existence."80 With Mapp, the Court hoped
to bring an end to the controversy that Wolf had begun.
Henceforth, the exclusionary rule would be applied to both
federal and state jurisdictions. 1
B. The Policies for the Rule
The Supreme Court has never entirely agreed on the poli-
cies underlying the exclusionary rule. Judicial integrity, gov-
ment after she demanded to see a warrant and then refused to let them enter. The
police thoroughly searched her apartment without consent and, seemingly, without
valid warrant. They arrested her for the possession of obscene materials found in a
trunk in the basement.
25. Id. at 655.
26. Id. at 651.
27. Id. at 657.
28. Id. at 658.
29. Id. at 659 (quoting J. Cardozo in People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150
N.E. 585, 587 (1926)).
30. Id. at 659.
31. Id. at 670.
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ernment development,82 and deterrence of illegal police con-
duct have most commonly been cited as rationales for
upholding the rule.38 Deterrence is the only policy surviving
twenty-one years of the rule's application to the states, and
"it is fair to say that [deterrence] ...is [the rule's] major
purpose."84
Judicial integrity prohibits the courts from allowing the
introduction of illegally obtained evidence. Elkins v. United
States" concerned the exclusion of several recordings and a
recording machine originally seized by state officers and
turned over to federal agents. The Court held that articles ob-
tained by state officers as a result of an unreasonable search
and seizure, without involvement of federal officers, could not
be used as evidence in a federal trial when the defendant
makes a timely motion for its suppression. Justice Stewart,
writing for the Court, stated that there is an "imperative of
judicial integrity" that demands "the rejection of a doctrine
that would freely admit in a federal criminal trial evidence
seized by state agents in violation of the defendant's constitu-
tional rights."' 1 He quoted Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion
in Olmstead v. United States87 for the proposition that "no
distinction can be taken between the government as prosecu-
tor and the government as judge."'8
Justice Stewart, in explaining the rationale for the doc-
trine of judicial integrity, also quoted Justice Brandeis' dis-
sent in Olmstead at length:
To declare that in the administration of the criminal law
the end justifies the means-to declare that the Govern-
ment may commit crimes in order to secure the convic-
tion of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribu-
tion. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should
32. The development theory finds its purpose in assuring that the government
will not profit from its unlawful conduct, thereby compelling people to obey the law
and trust in government. See infra note 33.
33. See 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT 17-20 (1st ed. 1978).
34. Id. at 17.
35. 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960).
36. Id. at 222.
37. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Justices Holmes and Brandeis stressed the importance
of 'the individual's right of privacy against the government's unwarranted intrusions.
38. 364 U.S. at 253 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 470
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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resolutely set its face.89
This "imperative of judicial integrity," was echoed in later
cases,40 but soon abandoned. 1
Deterrence has been the rule's most seriously considered
purpose, and presently remains its sole recognized rationale.
The Court first introduced the notion of deterrence in Wolf v.
Colorado,'42 where the Court expressed the need to avoid po-
lice violations of an individual's privacy. Justice Powell, deliv-
ering the opinion of the Court in United States v. Calandra,"
wrote that "[tihe rule's primary purpose is to deter future un-
lawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of
the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures.""
The actual effectiveness of the rule's deterrence on illegal
police conduct has been unclear. Justice Blackmun wrote in
United States v. Janis45 that "[tihe debate within the Court
on the exclusionary rule has always been a warm one. It has
been unaided, unhappily, by any convincing empirical evi-
dence as to the effects of the rule.'4 The problem has not
been the unavailability of empirical evidence,' 7 but that no
study has sufficiently demonstrated the rule's deterrent
effect.' 8
39. 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
40. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968); and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536, 538 (1975).
41. See generally United States v. Payner, 447 U.S.' 727, 731 (1980); Michigan v.
DeFillipo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976); United States
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976); U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342 (1974); cf.
United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1127
(1981).
42. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or
Unnatural Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment? 62 JUDICATURE 66, 67 (1978).
43. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
44. Id. at 347.
45. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
46. Id. at 446.
47. The Court was aware of the evidence offered in Oaks, Studying the Exclu-
sionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 667-68 (1970), that there
is no convincing empirical evidence to support a claim that the rule actually deters
illegal conduct of law enforcement officers. See also Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An
Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES
243 (1973). But see Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New
Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974).
48. Other studies are equally unconvincing. See Kaplan, Limits of the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (1974). The author asserts that the exclu-
sionary rule "must stand or fall simply on the basis of its demonstrated utility." See
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Judicial integrity and the government development the-
ory have met a common fate. In many instances only ritual
references have been made to "the imperative of judicial in-
tegrity" and the opinions "were so indefinite about the con-
trolling combination of rationales that deterrence could be-
come the sole rationale by default."' 9 The Court, by
continually limiting the rule's rationale to deterrence, renders
it little more than an empty blessing.
C. The Process of Erosion
The fourth and fifth amendment protections are analo-
gously safeguarded by the exclusionary rule, which makes un-
available to the trier of fact any "fruits of the poisonous
tree.' 50 A defendant will not stand trial or be convicted on a
charge based solely on evidence obtained pursuant to an ille-
gal arrest, search, or seizure. The evidence is said to be
"tainted" and unless other circumstances make the connec-
tion between the officer's illegal conduct and the evidence ob-
tained so attenuated as to purge the taint,51 the evidence will
be excluded."
By applying the exclusionary rule to the states, Mapp
mandated the suppression of any evidence produced by an
unreasonable search, or obtained without a warrant issued
under the proper authority and upon probable cause.' Mapp
failed to address, however, (1) whether the rule applied to the
states retroactively, (2) whether it was to be used outside the
also Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven that it is A De-
terrent to Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 404-409 (1979). But see Canon, Have Critics Proven
that it Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398-403 (1979).
49. See Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra, supra note 4, at 263-64.
50. The "fruits of the poisonous tree" are items of evidence directly obtained
pursuant to an illegal arrest, search, or seizure. Such evidence must be excluded on
fifth amendment grounds if it is found to be self-incriminating and the defendant has
standing to object to the violation. See 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note
33, at 612.
51. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963); Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341-42 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
52. Similarly, the tainted evidence will not be excluded where admitting it
would result in harmless error, or where its discovery would be inevitable. See 1 W.
LAFAV E, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 33, at 719-49.
53. The fourth amendment requires that the place to be searched and the per-
sons or things to be seized be described with particularity. This requirement can be
seen to fulfill the condition that the search be reasonable.
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criminal process, (3) whether it should exclude illegally ob-
tained evidence, when applicable, in all criminal proceedings,
and (4) whether such evidence could be used in the criminal
process but not in the case-in-chief. The subsequent resolu-
tion of these issues by the Supreme Court has gradually
eroded the fourth amendment protections safeguarded by the
exclusionary rule."
1. Erosion by the Progeny of Mapp
In 1965, the Supreme Court decided not to apply Mapp
retroactively to state convictions that had become final prior
to the overruling of Wolf.55 The Court, in Linkletter v.
Walker," held that the purpose of the exclusionary rule was
not furthered by applying it retroactively because the police
misconduct had already occurred and would not be deterred
by the release of the prisoners involved. The individual's pri-
vacy had already been violated and could not be restored.
The Court was not persuaded by the retroactive application of
the exclusionary rule in prior cases dealing with coerced con-
fessions. In those cases, the danger of unreliability was
greater, but "there [was] no likelihood of unreliability or coer-
cion present in search and seizure cases."" The plurality as-
serted that the right to exclude illegally obtained evidence was
not personal, but rather one to be considered with other fac-
tors, including whether the police would be deterred by its ap-
plication. Consequently, the scope of the rule's applicability
was limited to safeguarding the fourth amendment provisions
when police could be deterred.
In Terry v. Ohio,5e the Supreme Court ruled on whether
evidence obtained pursuant to a limited search based on less
than probable cause could be used to prosecute a defendant.
A detective, believing that three suspects were casing a store
for a robbery and might be armed, stopped them after notic-
54. This comment, in its limited scope, will simply consider Mapp's progeny in
light of these questions. The issues of standing to raise the rule and its application to
other equally pertinent fifth amendment violations will not be considered.
55. Mapp was applied, however, to cases still pending on direct appeal at the
time the decision was handed down. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622, 640
(1965).
56. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
57. Id. at 637.
58. Id. at 638.
59. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Chief Justice Warren wrote the opinion.
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ing that they had repeatedly strolled by and peered into a
store window. 0 A frisk uncovered two pistols which were in-
troduced into evidence. The Court ruled the "stop and frisk"
reasonable under the fourth amendment both because the
scope of the "search" and "seizure" was limited to discovery
of weapons and because the search was based upon a reasona-
ble man's belief, under the circumstances, that his and others'
safety was in danger. 1 This exception to the traditional re-
quirements of probable cause was justified by the need for po-
lice safety and the interests of crime prevention and detec-
tion. These interests then had to be balanced with the
individual's fourth amendment rights. The Court acknowl-
edged the right of the individual to the possession and control
of his own person. The freedom from all restraint and inter-
ference of others was paramount 2s and continued to be safe-
guarded by the exclusionary rule. Nonetheless, the Court con-
sidered that in some contexts the rule was an ineffective
deterrent.8 Chief Justice Warren noted that the use of the
rule should not discourage the employment of other remedies
to curtail abuses where the exclusionary rule was
inappropriate."s
Regarding the necessity of probable cause for a search
and seizure, the Court saw it "imperative that the facts bejudged against an objective standard." ' 5 "[S]imple good faith
on the part of the arresting officer [was] not enough . . . if
subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of
the Fourth Amendment would evaporate. .. .
Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that a "search" and
"seizure" based on less than the traditional requirements of
probable cause was unconstitutional. He felt that the Court
was giving the police greater authority to search and seize
than a magistrate could authorize (a warrant issued by a mag-
istrate requires probable cause). 7
60. Id. at 6.
61. Id. at 30.
62. Id. at 9.
63. Id. at 13.
64. Id. at 15.
65. Id. at 21.
66. Id. at 22 (quoting with approval Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964)).
67. Id. at 35-36 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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2. Erosion by the Burger Court
Since the arrival of Chief Justice Burger and the other
Nixon appointees to the Court, erosion of the exclusionary
rule has accelerated.6 The new Chief Justice promptly ex-
pressed his willingness to discard the rule, although he did not
propose its abandonment until some meaningful alternative
could be developed."
In 1974, the Burger Court held in United States v. Ca-
landra°7 0 that a grand jury witness (the accused) could not re-
fuse to answer questions on grounds that they were based on
evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure.7 The
district court had granted the defendant's motion to exclude
the illegally obtained evidence, ruling that he need not answer
questions on grounds of self-incrimination. 2 Justice Powell,
writing for the Court, concluded that the grand jury's primary
function was the determination of whether a crime had been
committed and whether criminal proceedings should be insti-
tuted against any persons. The proceedings did not amount to
an adversary hearing where the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused was adjudicated."
The majority stressed that the rule was a judicially cre-
ated remedy intended to deter unlawful police conduct, hold-
ing that:
Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule
[had] never been interpreted to proscribe the use of ille-
gally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all per-
sons. As with any remedial device, the application of the
rule [had] been restricted to those areas where its reme-
dial objectives [were] thought most efficaciously served. 7'
The Court concluded that allowing the witness to invoke the
68. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 338 (1971) Chief Justice Burger explains his approach.
69. Id. at 420-21.
70. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
71. Id. at 351-52.
72. 332 F. Supp. 737, 742 (N.D. Ohio 1971). The law enforcement officers had
obtained a warrant to search defendant's office on a gambling investigation. They
proceeded to search not only his office but also his home and his car finding no evi-
dence of paraphenalia specified in the warrant. They came instead upon evidence of
loansharking and seized books and records of defendant's company as well as stock
certificates.
73. 414 U.S. at 343-44.
74. Id. at 348.
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exclusionary rule would interfere with the "effective and expe-
ditious discharge of the grand jury's duties;" that the fourth
amendment did not require adoption of every proposal that
might deter police misconduct; and that the incremental de-
terrent effect achieved by extending the rule in this case was
uncertain at best. 5 It was further noted that the accused had
no right of privacy before the grand jury and that the Court's
holding applied to evidence seized during the course of an un-
lawful search and seizure, including any "fruits" derived
therefrom.7
Justice Brennan's dissent" vehemently attacked the ma-
jority's opinion and stated that the majority's "downgrading
of the exclusionary rule to a determination of whether its ap-
plication in a particular type of proceeding furthers deter-
rence of future police misconduct reflects a startling objective
and purpose of the rule."'78 He stressed that the exclusionary
rule was "part and parcel" of the fourth amendment protec-
tions. 9 Unlike the majority, he was unpersuaded that the de-
fendant was sufficiently protected by the inadmissibility of ev-
idence at other steps of the criminal prosecution. Justice
Brennan feared that:
[W]hen next we confront a case of conviction rested on
illegally seized evidence, [the Calandra] decision will be
invoked to sustain the conclusion in that case also, that
"it is unrealistic to assume" that the application of the
rule at trial would "significantly further" the goal of de-
terrence-though, if the police are presently undeterred,
it is difficult to see how removal of the sanction of exclu-
sion will induce more lawful official conduct.80
Justice Brennan's fear was not unfounded. Subsequent Court
decisions have continued the erosion. In United States v.
Janis,"1 the Court held that the exclusionary rule should not
be extended to forbid the use of illegally seized evidence by a
law enforcment agent of one sovereign in a civil proceeding of
75. Id. at 349-51.
76. Id. at 353-55.
77. He was joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall. Id. at 356.
78. 414 U.S. at 356.
79. Id. at 360 (quoting with approval Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961)).
80. Id. at 365-66.
81. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
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another sovereign.82 This holding distinguished Elkins v.
United States,"5 which had overruled the "silver platter doc-
trine," permitting the use of illegally seized evidence in in-
trasovereign exchanges. In Janis, Los Angeles police illegally
seized gambling records and cash from the defendants. The
police then notified the Internal Revenue Service which as-
sessed wagering taxes and levies upon the cash.84 The Court
quoted Calandra to establish that the prime purpose of the
rule was to "deter future unlawful police conduct" and con-
cluded that "[iun the complex and turbulent history of the
rule, the Court never [had] applied it to exclude evidence
from a civil proceeding, federal or state. ' 85 The Court found
that because the officers had relied in good faith on a warrant
which later proved to be defective, they had already been de-
terred by the exclusion of the evidence from the criminal pro-
ceeding. The rule's "marginal deterrent [effect was] diluted by
the attenuation existing when a different sovereign used the
material in a civil proceeding." '
In a modest footnote, the Court reviewed the purposes
behind the exclusionary rule, finding deterrence was its prime
purpose, and "judicial integrity" was "a relevant, albeit
subordinate factor . . . . Judicial integrity clearly does not
mean that the courts must never admit evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment."" In light of the Court's
decisions in United States v. Peltier" and Michigan v. Tuck-
er,8" the Court, in Janis, suggested that the inquiry into "judi-
cial integrity" was essentially the same as the inquiry into
whether exclusion of evidence would serve as a deterrent.
82. Id. at 459-60.
83. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
84. 428 U.S. at 433.
85. Id. at 447.
86. Id. at 454 n.27. The Court felt that the rule's marginal utility was out-
weighed by its costs.
87. Id. at 458 n.35.
88. 422 U.S. 531 (1975). Evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed
only if the law enforcement officer had knowledge or could properly be charged with
knowledge that the search was unconstitutional under the fourth amendment. Peltier
declined to give retroactivity to Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 415 U.S. 266
(1973).
89. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). Miranda warnings are only prophylatic standards
designed to safeguard or to provide practical enforcement for the privilege against
self-incrimination and are not themselves constitutional protections.
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Neither purpose was found determinative1o
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided to restrict certain
state claims of fourth amendment violations from its review.
Stone v. Powell" inflicted another setback upon the rule by
giving the district courts discretion to determine which state
cases would ultimately reach the Supreme Court's docket.2
Powell's murder conviction in California state courts was
based partly on evidence obtained when he was arrested in
Nevada under a vagrancy ordinance which was subsequently
declared unconstitutional. The defendant moved to have the
evidence suppressed. After an unsuccessful appeal in state
court and the denial of a habeas corpus petition by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, he petitioned for habeas corpus relief
in federal court.93
The Supreme Court reiterated that the exclusionary rule
"was a judicially created means of effectuating the rights se-
cured by the Fourth Amendment,""' but noted that in Mapp
only four justices had required the exclusion of unconstitu-
tionally seized evidence in state criminal trials.'5
Given the Court's weak support for the exclusion of evi-
dence in Mapp, Justice Powell cautioned that to apply the
90. Justices Brennan and Marshall, as usual in fourth amendment exclusionary
cases, dissented. Justice Brennan wrote: "Today's decisions in this case . . .con-
tinue[s] the Court's business of slow strangulation of the rule." United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. at 460.
91. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
92. Id. at 469, 482. The Supreme Court, eight years after Powell was convicted
of murder, decided the issue of whether "a federal court should consider, in ruling on
a petition for habeas corpus filed by a state prisoner, a claim that evidence obtained
by an unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at his trial, when he has
previously been afforded an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his claim in the
state courts." Justice Powell, writing the opinion of the court, stated that the Consti-
tution does not require that a state prisoner be granted such habeas corpus relief. Id.
93. Id. at 470-71. Defendant filed for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in
the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California alleging that (1) the
statute under which he was arrested was vague and that (2) the officer who arrested
him had no probable cause for the arrest. The court ruled that the officer had proba-
ble cause for the arrest, that even if the ordinance was unconstitutional, the deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule did not require a bar to admission of the fruits of
search incident to an otherwise valid arrest, and if there was error in admitting the
evidence, it was harmless. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed. It held that the statute was unconstitutional, the arrest was therefore ille-
gal, and exclusion would deter the legislature from enacting unconstitutional statutes.
507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974).
94. Id. at 482.
95. Id. at 484 n.21.
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rule indiscriminately would, instead of nurturing respect for
fourth amendment values, generate disrespect for both the
law and the administration of justice.
Chief Justice Burger concurred, reaffirming his belief that
the Weeks mandate should not be operative here. Unlike
Stone, Weeks had not dealt with the question of burglar's
tools and other incriminating evidence."
Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, thought the Court
had missed the point presented by Stone. Justice Brennan
felt that the real issue was the availability of a federal forum
to vindicate federally guaranteed rights,97 and not the ques-
tion of a defendant's right to have evidence excluded at a
criminal trial when that evidence was seized "in contravention
of rights ostensibly secured by the fourth and fourteenth
amendments."' 8 He wrote that a state's rejection of fourth
amendment claims under the Federal Constitution would be
without redress because the majority gave the district courts
total discretion as to whether or not to review state cases
where fourth amendment constitutional rights may have been
violated. Congress should decide these questions. Justice
Brennan feared that this decision would be followed by claims
"of double jeopardy, entrapment, self-incrimination, Miranda
violations, and use of invalid identification procedures-that
[the] Court later decides are not 'guilt related.'"99 He felt that
the majority compromised constitutional values in an attempt
to protect society from lawbreakers.' 00 In summary, he noted
that if the Court wished to modify or do away with the exclu-
sionary rule, it should "at least [accomplish it] with some
modicum of logic and justification,"'' which he found lacking
in the majority's opinion.
Justice White also dissented, asserting that Weeks and
Mapp "had overshot their mark insofar as they aimed to de-
ter lawless actions by enforcement personnel .... "0o Yet, he
96. Id. at 497.
97. The availability as a matter of right to a federal habeas corpus proceeding is
provided under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1977).
98. Stone v. Powell, 482 U.S. at 503 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
explained that he had used "ostensibly" because it was clear the Court had not yet
given its "final frontal assault on the exclusionary rule." Id. n.1.
99. Id. at 517-18.
100. Id. at 524.
101. Id. at 534.
102. Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
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was not in favor of overruling either case. He would only mod-
ify the rule "to prevent its application in those circumstances
where the evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting in
the good-faith belief that his conduct comported with existing
law and having reasonable ground for his belief."103 The rule's
deterrent effect would not be furthered in situations where
the police acted reasonably under the circumstances. The ad-
mission of evidence under such "good-faith" searches and
seizures would not "render judges participants in fourth
amendment violations" by allowing its use in court. "The vio-
lation, if there was one, had already occurred and the evidence
[was] at hand.' 0 4
In Michigan v. DeFillippo,'0' the Court partly adopted
the "good-faith" approach suggested by White in Powell. The
defendant, arrested pursuant to a "stop and identify" ordi-
nance subsequently declared unconstitutional, was searched
and charged with possession of a controlled substance.10' The
Court upheld the arrest because it was allowed under the or-
dinance and the officers had complied in good faith with the
existing law. Because the search was performed pursuant to a
valid arrest, the defendant could not have the evidence sup-
pressed. The officers did not violate the defendant's rights
simply because they should have known the ordinance was in-
valid and would later be declared unconstitutional.107
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented, argu-
ing that this was not a matter of an officer's good-faith actions
and the defendant's conviction from evidence found on his
person, but rather, "[t]he ultimate issue [was] whether the
state gathered evidence against the respondent through un-
constitutional means."'' Because the ordinance was unconsti-
tutional, the state, through its officers, could not arrest citi-
103. Id.
104. Id. at 540.
105. 443 U.S. 31 (1979). Before the Court began analyzing Justice White's
"good-faith" exception, it distinguished a number of cases in which the exclusionary
rule was found inapplicable on different grounds. In United States v. Ceccolini, 435
U.S. 268 (1978), the Court found that there was sufficient attenuation between the
officers' illegal search and the witness testimony to purge the taint and that a witness
testimony was different from other tangible evidence. Since witnesses were free to
testify, and their testimony would be obtained inevitably, it should not be excluded
from the grand jury to show the defendant had committed perjury.
106. Id. at 31-34.
107. Id. at 37.
108. Id. at 43.
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zens legally, even if those officials possessed a good-faith belief
that they were complying with the law. For that reason, the
dissenters considered the arrest illegal and would have ex-
cluded any evidence obtained pursuant to that arrest. It mat-
tered not that the offender was convicted for possessing illegal
drugs rather than for violating the ordinance.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has openly adopted the good-faith exclusion. United States v.
Williamsl'" held that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable in
cases where an officer had a reasonable, though mistaken,
good-faith belief that the actions leading to the discovery of
the evidence were authorized.110 The court first reiterated the
fact that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally man-
dated. It then turned to the rule's deterrent effect in this case
and said it made "no sense to speak of deterring police officers
who acted in good-faith belief that their conduct was le-
gal. . ... " The Court of Appeals found support for their po-
sition accepting United States v. Janis"'1 and a number of
other Supreme Court cases.113 The court observed that the of-
ficer had ample probable cause to support his conduct and
had proceeded with unquestionable good faith. Furthermore,
the majority believed that the decision did not undercut the
fourth amendment because "it concern[ed] only the exclusion-
ary rule, one device-but not the sole one-for enforcing the
amendment."114 The cost of applying the rule in these circum-
stances was "paid in coin tainted from the very core of [the]
109. 622 F.2d 830, 841 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127
(1981). A fourteen judge majority adopted the good-faith exception.
110. Id. at 846-47. A Drug Enforcement Administration agent arrested the de-
fendant after ascertaining that she was in breach of travel restrictions imposed by the
Northern District Court of Ohio. Her motion to suppress evidence of two packs of
heroin had been granted in that court and she was released pending appeal of that
decision on condition that she stay in Ohio. The D.E.A. agent stopped her at At-
lanta's International Airport and upon verifying her identity, arrested her. On a
search, a pack of heroin was found in her pocket. A subsequent search of defendant's
luggage made pursuant to a valid warrant uncovered additional quantities of heroin.
111. Id. at 841.
112. 428 U.S. at 433.
113. Cf. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (failure to produce warrant);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (vagrancy ordinance violation, subsequent search
and gun found); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (no warrant-roving bor-
der patrol search); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (self-incrimination);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (evidence seized, unrelated to warrant
specifications).
114. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at 847.
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fact finding process, the cost of holding trials at which the
truth is deliberately . . .suppressed and witnesses . ..are
forbidden to tell the whole truth and censured if they do.""'
D. The Choice Between Further Erosion or Safeguarding
Fourth Amendment Protections
The Fifth Circuit's acceptance of the good-faith exception
in Williams offers an alternative to the application of the ex-
clusionary rule. The question is, however, whether the rule
was meant simply to deter "unreasonable" or "bad-faith" po-
lice conduct.
The defenders of the rule contend that all evidence ob-
tained by the police pursuant to constitutional violations must
indeed be excluded regardless of reasonable good-faith be-
liefs. " 6 The line should not be drawn between minor viola-
tions on one hand, and gross or aggravated ones on the other,
simply because minor violations infringe less on individual
rights.1 1 7 This sliding scale approach is unacceptable. The de-
fenders maintain that the exclusionary rule is closely allied to
fourth amendment provisions, and that police deterrence was
not the sole reason for its original invocation in Weeks.' 8
Deterrence had initially been introduced as a rationale in
Wolf v. Colorado, in which the Supreme Court debated "the
wisdom of the exclusionary rule."" In retrospect, the Court
in Weeks, as well as the opinions of Justice Holmes and Bran-
deis in Olmstead, stressed the indivisible unity between all
branches of government. According to these opinions, the
courts in their prosecutorial role should exclude evidence ille-
gally seized by the law enforcement officers. 20 Otherwise the
government, through the judiciary, would affirmatively sanc-
tion its own illegal conduct. Therefore, for those who view the
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Kamisar, A Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 15 CRIM. L. BULL.
5 (1979).
117. Justice Powell seems to adhere to this sliding scale approach. He proposes
weighing the harm caused by the suppression of evidence with the benefits and rights
the exclusionary rule safeguards. See Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment,
supra note 11, at 652.
118. See Schroch & Welsh, supra note 4, at 281-312 and accompanying text.
119. See McKan, Mapp v. Ohio, The Exclusionary Rule and the Right of Pri-
vacy, 15 ARMz. L. REv. 327, 330 (1973).
120. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469-85 (1928) (no distinction
between the government as prosecutor and the government as judge).
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government's judicial and prosecutorial roles as a single en-
tity, it is no argument that evidence illegally obtained in good
faith can ever be admissible. Consequently, the exclusionary
rule and the provisions of the fourth amendment go hand in
hand; it is not the rule that handcuffs the police, but the con-
stitutional provisions guaranteed to the citizens of all states.
The choice left to the courts then, is not between a judicially
created remedial rule and the fourth amendment. The choice
is between upholding the amendment's provisions or rejecting
them. What was an unconstitutional search or seizure before
the exclusionary rule was applied to the states would remain
unconstitutional even if the rule is abandoned."'1
Heading the opposition to the rule, Chief Justice Burger
believes that there is no empirical evidence to support even a
minimal claim of deterrence. He expressed his willingness to
throw out the rule in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,12 2 a case decided during his
early days on the Court. Bivens concerned the viability of a
civil action for damages pursuant to an unconstitutional
search and seizure by agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics. The Court, per Justice Brennan, held that damages were
recoverable upon proof of injuries resulting from the agents'
violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights and re-
manded the case.123
Among the dissenters 2 4 was Chief Justice Burger, who
found it improper for the court to allow remedies not pro-
vided in the Constitution or enacted by Congress, but con-
cluded that the case had "significance far beyond its facts and
its holding." ' In his analysis, he expressed the point that
"[r]ejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-
doing official, while it may, and likely will release the wrong-
doing defendant."1 2 He affirmed that "[i]f an effective alter-
native remedy [was] available, concern for the official obser-
vance of the law [would] not require adherence to the exclu-
121. See Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspective, supra note
4.
122. 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Burger).
123. Id. at 397-98.
124. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Black filed separate dis-
senting opinions.
125. 403 U.S. at 412.
126. Id. at 413 (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1974)).
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sionary rule." '127 He acknowledged that the exclusionary rule
had "been justified on the theory that the relationship be-
tween the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment
and the Fourth Amendment required the suppression of evi-
dence seized in violation of the latter.' 2 8
According to the Chief Justice, however, the self-incrimi-
nation clause did not protect a person from a seizure of in-
criminating evidence, but protected him simply "from being
the conduit by which the police acquired evidence."' 29 The
Chief Justice found no merit to the suppression doctrine's
vague assumption that law enforcement was a monolithic gov-
ernment enterprise. Furthermore, even making such an as-
sumption, the educative effect of the suppression of evidence
was reduced by the long time lapse between the original un-
lawful police conduct and its final judicial evaluation.3 0 The
Court's indiscriminate punishment of an officer because of his
conduct was incomprehensible to Chief Justice Burger. An of-
ficial's smallest mistakes were punished the same as deliberate
and flagrant ones, by the exclusion of valid probative evi-
dence. The Chief Justice submitted that society had the right
to expect more "rationally graded responses from judges" in-
stead of the "capital punishment" they inflicted on all evi-
dence obtained through police error. "' He proposed that Con-
gress provide a remedy for the victims of unlawful police
conduct, and put forth a simply structured statute as an ex-
ample. " " Without an existing remedy, however, the Chief Jus-
tice would not propose abandoning the rule.
Some Supreme Court Justices did not show the Chief
Justice's restraint. They would eliminate the rule, at least as
it applied to the states,3 3 and stressed that the rule handcuffs
127. Id. at 414.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 414.
130. Id. at 418-19.
131. Id. at 420.
132. Id. at 422-23. The text of the proposal is found in the Chief Justice's opin-
ion. Note that he would establish a quasi-judicial tribunal to adjudicate all claims
falling within the proposed statute.
133. Justice Harlan, for example, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring), a case decided with Bivens, expressed the need to
overhaul the law of search and seizure, indicating he would start the process by over-
ruling Mapp. In that same opinion, Justices Black and Blackmun asserted that the
fourth amendment did not support the exclusionary rule. Id. at 497 (Black, J., con-
curring and dissenting) and Id. at 510 (Blackmun, J., joining Justice Black in the
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the police and aids the guilty without protecting the innocent.
Several commentators argue that the rule should be re-
placed.1 ,3 4 Claiming that it is not cost-effective and not man-
dated by the fourth amendment, they argue that the exclu-
sionary rule provides little or no guidance as to proper police
conduct under the fourth amendment and may even be seen
to encourage law enforcement officers "to tell the higher
truth" (perjure themselves) in order to preserve the probative
evidence.
Furthermore, the rule remains an external sanction to po-
lice administration and provides no incentive to develop inter-
nal disciplinary action. By the rule's application to the states,
the Supreme Court has made it virtually impossible to experi-
ment with other methods of controlling unreasonable and un-
lawful police conduct.13
5
E. Deterrence and "Bright-Line" Alternatives for Fourth
Amendment Protections
The deterrence of police misconduct alone may not be a
sufficiently compelling reason to maintain the exclusionary
rule.136 For those who claim that the "argument for the exclu-
sionary rule must stand or fall simply on its demonstrated
utility,"1' the answer may be unclear because the evidence is
inconclusive as to the rule's actual deterrent effect. 38
There are those who have already decided on the rule's
fate. They are convinced that the rule is "little more than a
loophole through which the guilty wriggle to escape punish-
ment" and that it should be replaced entirely with a tort rem-
edy. 3' Their efforts have not yet produced conclusive results.
portion to the effect that the fourth amendment does not support the rule).
134. See Wilkey, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
135. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 365-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 551-52 (1975) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). This is especially true where it is presupposed that the exclusionary rule
seeks to deter by punishment or threat. The rationale is to deter unlawful police
conduct by removing the incentives to disregard the rule.
137. Kaplan, supra note 48, at 1029 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
139. See Moya, supra note 12, at n.1, col. 1. Senators Strom Thurmond and
Orin Hatch proposed such a bill in the Senate. Their attempts have been unsuccess-
ful. Senator Dennis DeConcini proposed another bill to permit judges to decide when
to admit illegally seized evidence. His bill seemed to meet with the approval of the
President who encouraged the senator at a White House meeting.
California Lieutenant Governor, Mike Curb, had also advocated some changes in
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The major alternative to the elimination of the rule has
been the "good-faith exception" proposed in Powell. This ex-
ception focuses on the law enforcement officer's conduct and
measures it according to an objective standard of reasonable-
ness. The focus, therefore, shifts from the defendant to the
police officer's conduct. Initially the policeman is "put on
trial" in place of the defendant and his conduct is weighed
against other factors, such as the existence or lack of probable
cause for his behavior.1 40 The good-faith exception allows into
evidence the results of a search or seizure where the officers
relied in good faith on an ordinance later declared unconstitu-
tional,14 1 where probable cause may not have existed but the
officers possessed a good faith though mistaken belief that
they possessed the authority to arrest, search and seize.1 4'
The good-faith exception further erodes the exclusionary
rule because it allows into evidence the results of police con-
duct which, as Chief Justice Warren warned in Terry, cannot
be based upon good faith alone. 4  The exception focuses en-
tirely on the conduct of the police and gives little or no weight
to the right of the people to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. The exception allows law enforcement
officers to make decisions based on their views of probable
cause, without a magistrate's objectivity, and then to act upon
them.
If the good-faith exception is accepted by the Supreme
Court, 44 the policy of deterrence, eroded by another excep-
the exclusion of evidence. See Letter from Mike Curb to Voters (Dec. 12, 1981) (Citi-
zens Committee to Stop Crime, P.O. Box 13299, Sacramento, CA 95813).
140. See Ball, supra note 10, at 640 (comparison between the good-faith excep-
tion and the law governing malicious prosecution). Professor Ball reduces the goodfaith analysis to a three prong equation: (1) where there is neither probable cause norgood faith, evidence is excluded, (2) where there is probable cause without good faith,probable cause makes the conduct lawful and the evidence admissible, (3) where
there is no probable cause but there is good faith-the exclusionary rule is applied
notwithstanding the officer's good faith. She contends that the rule should not applyin the last situation because, as in malicious prosecution, proper motive would bar theimposition of sanctions for "unlawful" acts. The state would have to rebutt the pre-
sumption of no good faith where probable cause did not exist.
141. Michigan v. DeFillipo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
142. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (1980), cert. denied 449 U.S.
1127 (1981).
143. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20-27.
144. The swing vote may well rest with Justice O'Connor whose voting record in
criminal cases has not been established yet. In the Arizona Court of Appeals she
wrote at least one opinion where the court upheld the admission of a confession be-
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tion, may be insufficient to support the rule. The deterrent
effect will be limited to cases where officers lack both probable
cause and good faith, and in such cases, it will be equally as
difficult to prove the rule's utility in deterring unlawful police
conduct. In this context, the only relevant and determinative
factors will be the existence or lack of probable cause, and the
absence of an officer's good-faith belief.
III. CONCLUSION
The alternatives for the future of the exclusionary rule
may depend on who works most efficiently to eliminate the
rule. If Congress replaces it by a statutory tort remedy, as
Chief Justice Burger proposed in Bivens, the Court may opt
to overrule Mapp and delegate the authority of safeguarding
the people's fourth amendment rights to the states. On the
other hand, if Congress does not agree on a remedy, which is a
likely course given most recent unsuccessful attempts, the
Court may follow the second alternative and adopt the good-
faith exception.1 45 In either case, the people's fourth amend-
ment rights are precariously safeguarded by the exclusionary
rule. The alternatives are nothing but paths to the same
course. To further erode the controversial "judicial remedy"
may inevitably lead to its elimination.
Simao Avila
cause it was supported by substantial evidence and there was no "clear and manifest
error." See State v. Brooks, 127 Ariz. 130, 618 P.2d 624 (1980). Her record in the
Supreme Court is mixed. She has, for example, joined the majority in a six to three
vote upholding a 40-year sentence imposed on a Virginia man convicted of two minor
marijuana offenses. See Greenhouse, Justice O'Connor is Mostly With the Majority,
Los Angeles Daily J., Feb. 1, 1982, at 3, col. 3. She has, however, also voted to over-
turn a teenage murderer's death sentence in a recent case. It may be safe to assume
that she will vote with the four justices who have shown support for the good-faith
exception or have expressed the desire to do away with the exclusionary rule
altogether.
145. Congress may also enact legislation allowing judicial discretion to admit
illegally obtained evidence where the officer is shown to have acted in good faith. See
supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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